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RULE 404(b)'s "OTHER ACTS"
CHARACTER FLAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence had been constant in its role as
the character evidence rule. The rule evolved from its common law origins out
of a need to address the prejudicial effects of character evidence introduced to
juries during trial.' However, the continued judicial deconstruction of Rule 404
has now intruded on what used to be its most unquestioned and unifying
component: character. The change is traceable to Congress's amendment of
Rule 404(b) in 1991, which added a notice requirement in criminal cases for
extrinsic act evidence used during a case-in-chief, for impeachment, and for
possible rebuttal.2
Prior to the adoption of Rule 404(b)'s notice requirement, there was no
evident need to define the character scope of the rule's "other acts" clause
because any extrinsic act evidence offered was unobjectionable, provided it
was relevant to prove an element of a charged offense. However, the post-1991
Rule 404(b) jurisprudential landscape has been altered by the now-pertinent
analysis of the character scope of other acts, as prompted by the interplay
between the other acts clause and current notice obligations.3 Recent judicial
interpretations of Rule 404(b) have illustrated the latent ambiguity of other acts
when the clause is combined with the notice requirement and the rule's
advisory committee notes.4 Despite over a decade since Rule 404(b)'s notice
requirement was added, its other acts character scope remains on the
evidentiary frontier. Without the benefit of case law or legal opinions for
direction, the holdings of the first courts to reach this issue have been
predictably troubling.
The courts are faced with deciding whether Rule 404(b) govems other acts
only as they relate to character, therefore confining notice to acts that reflect
on character or, conversely, whether Rule 404(b)'s other acts language
encompasses all extrinsic acts of a defendant, therefore requiring notice of any
1. See generally JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
MANUAL 7-6 (Student ed. 1987) ("The rule rests on the theory that the risk that the jury will
convict for crimes other than those charged, or because defendant deserves punishment for his
prior bad acts, outweighs the probative value of the inference, 'he's done it before, he's done or
will do it again."').
2. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's note.
3. See generally United States v. Vega, 188 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1999) (illustrating an "other
acts" interpretation under Rule 404(b)'s notice requirement).
4. See, e.g., Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, United States v. Castro-Zepeda, No.
01 CR2163-BTM (S.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2002) (discussing the meaning of other acts and applying it
to the case); Vega, 188 F.3d at 1150 (illustrating an other acts interpretation under Rule 404(b)'s
notice requirement and using the advisory committee notes for guidance).
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extrinsic act evidence the prosecution may have.5 The argument for a character-
based analysis of other acts comes primarily from case law,6 legislative intent,7
and the context of Rule 404 itself.8 However, a textualist view of Rule 404(b)
and its advisory committee notes suggests other acts may be inclusive of all
extrinsic acts of a defendant.9 The resulting conflict has created a split between
judicial circuits on how to correctly apply Rule 404(b)'s other acts clause.'0
On the prosecutorial side, if other acts means any extrinsic act without
limitation, then the concern is that evidence offered to impeach a defendant and
evidence offered in rebuttal would be subject to Rule 404(b)'s notice
obligations. Such an interpretation would subject the evidence to notice even
though the offered evidence says nothing about the person's character or
propensity to act in conformity with the charged crime." The consequences of
such a broad discovery requirement would significantly alter the prosecution's
ability to effectively cross-examine a defendant. A defendant's knowledge of
the full breadth of the prosecution's evidence would allow for testimony to be
tailored around known facts, thereby preemptively evading potential
impeachment topics. In courtrooms where the other acts clause is held to
include non-character related evidence, classic impeachment by contradiction
may no longer be viable if Rule 404(b) requires the disclosure of extrinsic acts,
despite the inherent conflict with the rules of criminal procedure and Rules 608
and 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The consequences of other acts
interpretations are real and potentially staggering.
This Comment discusses Rule 404(b)'s other acts clause and the effect of
the 1991 notice requirement upon it. Part II of this Comment provides
background information on the role of Rule 404(b) in the Federal Rules of
Evidence and details the ambiguity and effects of other acts analysis. Part III
argues in favor of Rule 404(b)'s character foundation and uses the rule's 1975
enactment, the resulting 1991 amendments, and the case law leading up to and
following the 1991 amendments for support. Part IV analyzes the judicial
5. Compare Vega, 188 F.3d at 1154 (requiring notice of all extrinsic act evidence), with
United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that defendant's invocation of
Rule 404(b) to require notice of extrinsic act evidence was misplaced).
6. See generally Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181-82 (1997) (explaining that
Rule 404(b) reflects the common law tradition preventing the introduction of character evidence
because of its prejudicial effect); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685-86 (1988)
(identifying Rule 404 as governing character evidence).
7. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's note ("Subdivision (b) deals with a specialized
but important application of the general rule excluding circumstantial use ofcharacter evidence.").
8. See FED. R. EVID. 404 (containing the title "Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove
Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes").
9. The rule does not clarify what acts are to be included under the other acts clause. A plain
reading, without regard for the context of 404(b) within Rule 404, suggests other acts could
reasonably include all extrinsic acts.
10. See Vega, 188 F.3d at 1150; United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369 (5th Cir. 1995);
Beverly, 5 F.3d at 633.
11. See Brief for Appellee United States at 23-24, United States v. Castro-Zepeda, No. 01-
50606, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 23851 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2002).
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arguments advanced for and against whether Rule 404(b)'s other acts clause
should apply to acts of a defendant that have no intrinsic character
connotations, and the consequences of each approach. Part V suggests a path
that other acts jurisprudence should follow and concludes that interpreting
other acts as inclusive of all a defendant's extrinsic acts without limitation
simply misses the overarching premise of Rule 404 and its case-law progeny.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Rule 404(b): Application
In 1975, Congress enacted Rule 404(b) as a "specialized but important
application of the general rule excluding circumstantial use of character
evidence.' 2 "Character" has been defined as "a generalized description of
one's disposition, or of one's disposition in respect to a general trait, such as
honesty, temperance, or peacefulness."' 3 Character evidence reflects uniquely
on a person's acts or disposition, and issues of character evidence generally
arise in the following four contexts: (1) character to infer relevant conduct of
a defendant or of a victim; (2) character of a witness relevant to truthfulness;
(3) evidence of acts of the defendant that reflect on character, but are offered
for some purpose other than to infer conduct from character; and (4) character
as an element of a claim or defense.
Rule 404(b)'s function in the Federal Rules of Evidence is to regulate the
third arena of character evidence. 4 Rule 404(b) e... &blishes when a crime,
wrong, or act may be admissible for some relevant i., ,ose other than to prove
character or conduct "in conformity therewith."'" example, a prosecutor
may not introduce evidence of past convictions , .ply to infer character
propensity and to prove that a criminal defendant committed the charged crime.
"The prohibition is aimed at the tactic of attempting t.) prove a person's actions
on a particular occasion by offering evidence that the person has an ingrained
propensity to act in a certain way. The forbidden inference or inferential
connection is character or propensity-conforming conduct."'6
However, Rule 404(b) allows for the admis'iiorn )f character-revealing
evidence for other purposes, such as to prove "in of, , opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absenc: Wl stake or accident," or
12. FED. R. EvID. 404(b) advisory committee's note, subdivision (b).
13. Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1227, 1232 (2001) (citations omitted).
14. See generally GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 162 (3d
ed. 1996) (explaining evidence of other crimes maybe admissible "if its purpose is not simply to
show criminal disposition.., but rather to prove immediately ot ultimately one or more elements
of the crime charged").
15. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
16. Glen Weissenberger, Making Sense ofExtrinsic Act Evidence: Federal Rule ofEvidence
404(b), 70 IOWA L. REV. 579, 592 (1985).
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some other element of a charged offense, provided that it satisfies the usual
requirements for admissibility, including relevance. 7 However, it should be
noted that the rule's "laundry list" is not meant to be exhaustive or exclusive."
Rule 404(b) was first proposed in 1972 and, following amendment in 1991,
now reads:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice
in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial
notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.' 9
As a preliminary matter, there are several judicially constructed words and
phrases that cloud Rule 404(b) and have led to it being characterized as
incredibly "perplexing" and "vague."2 Two of these are the terms "intrinsic"
and "extrinsic" acts whose distinction is critical for Rule 404(b) admissibility.2
Extrinsic acts are those that are completely distinct from a common nucleus of
an alleged crime.22 For example, the purchase of a bicycle in 1996 is an act
extrinsic to robbing a bank in 1999. For purposes of 404(b) analysis, extrinsic
acts are the focus of the rule, as it seeks to keep irrelevant former acts out of
current judicial proceedings to prevent any potential prejudicial effect on the
jury." However, an intrinsic act is one that is "inextricably intertwined" with
the alleged crime.2" For example, the act of paying a welder to alter a gas tank
17. See FED. R. EVID. 401,402,404. Rule 401 sets forth the definition of relevant evidence
as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
Id. at 401.
18. See United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that Rule
404(b)'s list of acceptable grounds for admission of evidence "is not exhaustive," and evidence
is admissible if it is necessary, reliable, and relevant to an issue other than character).
19. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
20. Kenneth J. Melilli, The Character Evidence Rule Revisited, 1998 BYU L. REv. 1547,
1562 (1998).
21. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
22. See United States v. Stouffer, 986 F.2d 916, 926 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining that other
act evidence is not considered extrinsic when it is relevant to establish the existence of criminal
conspiracy).
23. See United States v. Manning, 79 F.3d 212, 218 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating Rule 404(b)
excludes only extrinsic evidence), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 853 (1996).
24. See United States v. Williams, 900 F.2d 823,825 (5th Cir. 1990) ("'Other Act' evidence
is 'intrinsic' when the evidence of the other act and the evidence of the crime charged are
'inextricably intertwined' or both acts are part of a'single criminal episode' or the other acts were
[Vol. 54: 495
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in a 1990 truck to create a compartment for smuggling drugs is intrinsic to the
crime of smuggling drugs in the gas tank of a 1990 truck. Rule 404(b) has no,
bearing on acts that are intrinsic to the charged offense, and when such
evidence is offered, the evidence is not subject to Rule 404(b)'s analytical
hoops." Therefore, intrinsic acts are not excluded by Rule 404(b), while
extrinsic acts are generally barred, unless introduced to prove an element of a
charged offense rather than character or propensity.
The confusion surrounding the technicalities of the rule extends to the
courts. Rule 404(b) has accounted for a greater number of published judicial
opinions than any other provision in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
2" The large
number of diverse legal questions that have surfaced from Rule 404(b) are now
joined by another unique concern, the scope of the rule's other acts clause.
B. The Skeleton of Other Acts
Prior to the 1991 notice requirement, other acts interpretations had no place
in Rule 404(b) jurisprudence because a party's objections to the introduction
of extrinsic act evidence were effectively limited to when the extrinsic act only
proved an element of the charged offense through an impermissible link to
character propensity or the extrinsic act constituted impeachment on a
collateral matter. However, with the notice requirement, the possibilities for
objections to other acts evidence has grown, forcing the courts to interpret the
clause.
The opening sentence of Rule 404(b) reads: "Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith." Other "crimes" and "wrongs," by their
very nature, are acts which negatively reflect upon character and show an
increased propensity to commit a "bad act." For example, evidence that proves
a defendant previously committed bank robbery would strongly suggest
negative character and a heightened propensity to commit a similar crime or
wrong. Hence, the common underlying theme is that evidence of other crimes
and wrongs is intertwined with character evidence because of what it reveals
about the person who committed that act.
,necessary preliminaries' to the crime charged.") (citation omitted).
25. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b) advisory committee's note on 1991 amendment (stating the
amended rule "does not extend to evidence of acts which are 'intrinsic' to the charged offense.")
(citing Williams, 900 F.2d at 823); Manning, 79 F.3d at 218 ("[C]ases are legion in
which ... intrinsic circumstantial evidence has been admitted without occasioning either challenge
or analysis under Rule 404(b)") (citation omitted); United States v. Coleman, 78 F.3d 154, 156
(5th Cir. 1996) (noting that intrinsic evidence does not implicate Rule 404(b)).
26. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's note on 1991 amendment ("Rule 404(b)
has emerged as one of the most cited Rules in the Rules of Evidence."); Edward J. Imwinkelried,
The Use of Evidence ofan Accused's Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines
Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 575 (1990)
(characterizing the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence as the single most important
issue in contemporary criminal evidence law).
2002]
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When preceded by "other crimes" and "wrongs," the phrase other acts
seems out of place.27 The language of Rule 404(b) raises questions. Should
other acts mean other bad acts? Should it refer to other acts that reflect on
character or propensity, or to all extrinsic acts committed by a defendant
without limitation?28 Regardless of what other acts is taken to mean, the
ambiguity of the clause is apparent.
Despite its inherent vagueness and anti-contextual placement, the language
"other acts" remained harmless until Rule 404(b) was amended to include a
notice requirement.29 According to the advisory committee notes, the 1991
notice requirement was introduced as an effort to "reduce surprise and promote
early resolution on the issue of admissibility."3 In defining the parameters of
its notice provision, the committee required pretrial notice of available Rule
404(b) evidence, but allowed for the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence
during trial when reasonable, depending "largely on the circumstances of each
case."
31
The impact that the notice requirement was intended to have on criminal
prosecutions is unmistakable, but the dawning confusion over other acts
evidence was sewn into the legal fabric by a paragraph in the advisory
committee's note on the 1991 amendment:
The amendment requires the prosecution to provide notice,
regardless of how it intends to use the extrinsic act evidence
at trial, i.e., during its case-in-chief, for impeachment, or for
possible rebuttal. The court in its discretion may, under the
facts, decide that the particular request or notice was not
reasonable, either because of the lack of timeliness or
completeness. Because the notice requirement serves as
condition precedent to admissibility of 404(b) evidence, the
offered evidence is inadmissible if the court decides that the
notice requirement has not been met.32
In so stating, the committee blurred the line of when, or if, notice is required
for other acts. The resulting problems are, first, that the character scope of other
acts is undefined and, second, that there is a question of whether the notice
requirement should apply to extrinsic evidence offered to rebut testimony or
27. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
28. See United States v. Vega, 188 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 1999) (requiring notice of all
extrinsic act evidence); United States v. Williams, 900 F.2d 823, 826 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990) ("'Other
act' extrinsic evidence need not be evidence of other wrongful acts but may be evidence of any
extrinsic acts relevant to the criminal act charged.") (citation omitted).
29. See, e.g., Vega, 188 F.3d at 1150 (interpreting the clause under the notice requirement).
30. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's note on 1991 amendment.
31. Id.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 54: 495
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to impeach by contradiction, as the rule implies and the advisory committee
notes state.
For example, consider a situation in which a defendant is on trial for
stealing a car in Atlanta. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asks him
whether or not it is true that he bought groceries in Atlanta the day before the
crime. The defendant then testifies to an alibi that places him in Dallas for five
days leading up to the crime. In response, the prosecution introduces
surveillance videotape from a grocery store conclusively establishing the
defendant's presence in Atlanta the day before the crime. The defendant objects
to the admissibility of the videotape on Rule 404(b) grounds, believing the
prosecution failed to give notice in accordance with the rule. Inherent in the
court's analysis of whether the evidence is governed by Rule 404(b) are the
two problems produced by the advisory committee notes to the amended rule,
as mentioned above.
The first question is whether the videotape constitutes evidence of other
acts under Rule 404(b) if it only shows the defendant buying groceries-an act
reflecting neutrally on character. The second issue is whether Rule 404(b)
applies when the evidence is introduced to impeach by contradiction. These
questions form the critical mass of other acts analysis and, ironically, are the
product of the advisory committee's attempts to clarify the amendments to
Rule 404(b). There are essentially two ways to read other acts under the
amended rule. One requires notice of all acts of a defendant,
3 and the other
limits notice to acts that reflect on character. 4 It is as simple and as
complicated as that.
To further understand these issues, consider another situation in which a
defendant takes the stand in a federal criminal trial for drug trafficking and
testifies on direct examination that he has never met or known of person X. The
prosecution has evidence showing a close friendship between the two, which
it attempts to enter on cross-examination and later in rebuttal without giving
prior notice to the defense. Assuming the evidence is relevant and reflects
neutrally on the defendant's character, then there is an issue of whether the
evidence is properly admissible to impeach the witness' testimony. Subscribers
to a textualist interpretation of Rule 404(b) would surprisingly say no.
35
Looking strictly at the facts, the defendant's relationship with X is not a
crime or wrong under Rule 404(b), but it can be interpreted as an other act,
placing the defendant's relationship with X under the umbrella of the rule. A
textual reading of the rule finds the language "[e]vidence of other crimes,
wrongs or acts" '36 devoid of an explicit character requirement, seemingly
33. See Vega, 188 F.3d at 1154. In holding all extrinsic acts are other acts for Rule 404(b)
purposes, the court established that all acts are subject to notice, regardless of character. Id.
34. See United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1993).
35. See Vega, 188 F.3d at 1154; Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 551, United States
v. Castro-Zepeda, No. 01CR2163-BTM (S.D.Cal. Oct. 12, 2002).
36. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
2002]
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justifying the inclusion of the relationship as an other act, despite its failure to
speak to character or propensity. Under the plain language of the advisory
committee notes on the 1991 amendment, all extrinsic act evidence offered for
impeachment or for possible rebuttal requires disclosure to the defense within
a reasonable amount of time. In the example above, no notice was given, so
under a textual interpretation of the rule and its advisory committee notes, the
prosecution would not be allowed to contradict the defendant's testimony with
evidence of the relationship.
Contrary to the textualist view is the position that (1) the evidence should
be admissible as classic impeachment by contradiction, unless the defendant's
relationship with X is a collateral matter,37 and (2) the defendant's relationship
with X is not governed by Rule 404(b) because it says nothing about his
character or propensity. First, the argument is that, in situations where the
prosecution has evidence of extrinsic acts demonstrating that a defendant's trial
testimony is false, neither Rule 404(b) nor Rules 608 and 609 should apply.38
Impeachment by contradiction may be properly introduced in either cross-
examination or in rebuttal without regard to either rule. Secondly, it is
misguided to argue that Rule 404(b) applies to a relationship between the
defendant and X which does not reflect upon character or propensity. While the
exact text of Rule 404(b) does not describe other acts that reflect upon
character, it is difficult to ignore the context of other acts in the rule. "Other
acts not admissible to prove character" implies that the other act, when
included in the reference to "It" in the second sentence, must be an act with the
37. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b). No specific rule governs impeachment by contradiction, but
Rule 608 governs impeachment by character evidence and thus provides some direction.
38. Rules 608 and 609 govern the manner in which a witness's character for untruthfulness
may be established in order to impeach the witness. Rules 608 and 609 read, in relevant part, as
follows:
Rule 608. Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of
a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility,
other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved
by extrinsic evidence. Thk... may, however, in the discretion of the court, if
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the
witness being cross-examined has testified.
Rule 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime.
(1)... evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime
shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be
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potential to reflect on character." Further, Rule 404(b)'s common law
precursor, legislative intent, and case law support the rule's application to
character revealing evidence.40 Therefore, under this argument, Rule 404(b)'s
application is limited to character revealing acts, and other acts should properly
be interpreted as other acts that offer a character or propensity inference.
Each interpretation of Rule 404(b) is based in respectively divergent, but
acceptable, paths of the law.41 Consequently, the courts have struggled with
how to reconcile the plain wording of Rule 404(b) and its advisory committee
notes with its appropriate and, some would argue, intended effect.
42
A review of the case law indicates that other acts evidence problematically
collides with the 1991 notice requirement in certain predictable situations. Such
a situation occurs when: (1) the case is a criminal trial; (2) the prosecution
obtains evidence of an extrinsic act that has no intrinsic character or propensity
connotations within the context of a given case; (3) the prosecution does not
provide notice of the evidence to the defense because it is either immaterial to
its case-in-chief or the prosecution chooses to strategically hold it for
impeachment or rebuttal; (4) the defendant takes the stand and gives
exculpatory testimony; (5) the prosecution either attempts to impeach the
defendant on cross-examination with the undisclosed evidence or attempts to
offer the evidence on rebuttal to refute the defendant's testimony; and (6) the
defense objects on Rule 404(b) notice requirement grounds. In such a context,
a court is required to interpret the character parameters of Rule 404(b)'s other
acts clause.
III. RULE 404(b)'s CHARACTER FOUNDATION
The appropriate application of Rule 404(b)'s other acts should first be
dissected by a review of its character construction, as established by the rule's
common law heritage, legislative intent, and case law. In looking at the rule's
evolution, evidence reflecting upon character is impliedly necessary for other
acts application.
39. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
40. See infra discussion Part III and accompanying text.
41. Compare United States v. Vega, 188 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 1999) (requiring notice
of all extrinsic act evidence), with United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1993)
(holding that defendant's invocation of Rule 404(b) to require notice of extrinsic act evidence was
misplaced).
42. See Brief for Appellee United States at 21, United States v. Castro-Zepeda, No. 01-
50606, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 23851 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2002).
2002]
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A. Character Beginnings
Rule 404 is known as the character evidence rule43 and sets forth the
general proposition that "[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith."' The rule is inseparably associated with character, as evidenced in
part by its title: "Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct;
Exceptions; Other Crimes." Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1975, character evidence was governed by common law. 5 In
Michelson v. United States' Justice Jackson explained the policy behind
common law character evidence regulation:
The state may not show defendant's prior trouble with the
law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors,
even though such facts might logically be persuasive that he
is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime. The
inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the
contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so
overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general
record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a
particular charge. The overriding policy of excluding such
evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical
experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of
issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.47
43. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181-82 (1997); Huddleston v. United
States, 485 U.S. 681, 685-86 (1988).
44. FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (stating this general rule followed by exceptions for evidence of
a pertinent trait of the accused or of an alleged victim). Rule 404(a) reads as follows:
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character
or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence
of a trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an
accused and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of
character of the accused offered by the prosecution;
(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of
character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the
prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of
peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide
case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as
provided in rules 607, 608, and 609.
Id.
45. See generally Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,475-76 (1948) (identifying the
common law tradition excluding character evidence).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 475-76 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 54: 495
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The common law precursor to Rule 404(b) is defined as follows: "The doing
of another criminal act, not a part of the issue, is... not admissible as evidence
of the doing of the criminal act charged, except when offered for the specific
purpose of evidencing Design, Plan, Motive, Identity, Intent, or other relevant
fact ...distinct from Moral Character."4" Inherent in the common law
predecessors of Rule 404 is the consideration that character evidence is a
powerful prosecutorial tool that must be regulated by the imposition ofjudicial
or statutory checks.
Subdivision (b) of the advisory committee notes of Rule 404 cite to Slough
and Knightly's article, Other Vices, Other Crimes,49 which describes the
common law prohibition of using character evidence to show that a defendant
is a bad person and, therefore, likely to have committed the charged crime."
The committee's reliance on this article is another vivid indicator of Rule
404(b)'s foundational link to character evidence.
In summary, a review of the rule's title, its text, the common law, and the
rule's committee notes demonstrates that Rule 404(b) was enacted to regulate
character evidence and not evidence unrelated to character.
B. Character in the Courts
Applying Rule 404(b), the U.S. Supreme Court has followed the intent of
the rule's drafters and its common law heritage by promoting the character
backbone of the rule. In Huddleston v. United States5" the Court stated:
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)-which applies in both civil
and criminal cases-generally prohibits the introduction of
evidence of extrinsic acts that might adversely reflect on the
actor's character, unless that evidence bears upon a relevant
issue in the case such as motive, opportunity, or
knowledge .... The threshold inquiry a court must make
before admitting similar acts evidence under Rule 404(b) is
whether that evidence is probative of a material issue other
than character.2
Huddleston points out that the rule involves extrinsic act evidence that offers
some inference of character or propensity.
48. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE'S CODE OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
LAW § 356 (3d. ed. 1942).
49. M.C. Slough & J. William Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IOWA L. REV. 325
(1956).
50. Id.
51. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
52. Id. at 685-86 (emphasis added).
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In Old Chiefv. United States53 the Supreme Court reiterated the vital role
of acts inferring character for Rule 404(b) application. Although not at issue
in the case, Justice Souter discussed the rule's character link through a
discussion of common law character evidence.54 The Court again surmised that
Rule 404(b) "reflects the common law tradition" disallowing prosecutorial
reliance upon any kind of character evidence to establish the probability of a
defendant's guilt.5
In addition, although not addressing the scope of other acts, every judicial
circuit to address the rule's "other crimes" and "wrongs" has recognized that
the rule is invoked when character revealing evidence is introduced to prove
some element of a charged crime.56 Thus, while the cases in which the circuits
ruled on the character relation of the rule do not specifically address the full
spectrum of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" and, therefore, do not speak to the
scope of other acts, they are another indication of the rule's application solely
to evidence that reflects on character.
The steadfast role of character in Rule 404(b) led courts to consistently
limit its analysis to evidence of the defendant's character or propensity to act
in conformity with bad character. The character requirements of Rule 404(b)
appeared ingrained in the case law, as well as in the title, text, and common law
history of the rule.
53. 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
54. Id. at 180-82.
55. Id. at 181. The Court in Old Chief agreed with the defendant's argument that it is wrong
to allow a defendant's'earlier bad acts to be generalized into bad character. Id. at 180. The Court
agreed with the defendant's argument by explaining the common law tradition of Rule 404(b). Id.
at 181. However, the Court ultimately reached its evidentiary decision on Rule 403 grounds,
rendering its discussion of Rule 404(b) superfluous to the general facts presented. Id. at 182-83.
Nevertheless, the Court's treatment of the issue is revealing as to character's role in Rule 404(b).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Rawle, 845 F.2d 1244, 1247 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding Rule
404(b) extrinsic evidence must "tend[] to impugn a defendant's character"); United States v.
Stevens, 83 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying Rule 404(b) to "prior bad acts"); United States
v. Tutiven, 40 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994) (applying Rule 404(b) to evidence which shows a
defendant's "criminal propensity or bad character"); Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Archibald, 987
F.2d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Rule 404(b) applies to any extrinsic acts that might adversely
reflect on the actor's character."); United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1436 n.5 (10th Cir.
1985) (stating that an act need not be criminal but must tend to "impugn defendant's character"
in order to fall within Rule 404(b); United States v. Terebecki, 692 F.2d 1345, 1348 n.2 (11 th Cir.
1982) (holding act need not be criminal but must tend to impugn defendant's character to invoke
Rule 404(b)); United States v. Cooper, 577 F.2d 1079, 1087-88 (6th Cir. 1978) ("Conceivably
within the broad language of the rule is any conduct of the defendant which may bear adversely
on thejury'sjudgment of his character."); United States v. Miller, 573 F.2d 388, 392 n.6 (7th Cir.
1978) ("The addition of 'or acts' simply broadens the class of items that cannot be admitted to
show a defendant's propensity to commit crime" and the acts must be "wrongful."); United States
v. Cook, 557 F.2d 1149, 1152 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that the act must be wrongful or related in
nature to the present charge in order to qualify as an act under the rule).
[Vol. 54: 495
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IV. RULE 404(b)'s "OTHER ACTS" APPLICATION IN PRACTICE
The Supreme Court's57 and most judicial circuits' 8 acceptance of Rule
404(b)'s application to acts that reflect on character is now subject to challenge
by the previously ignored scope of other acts." Although the other acts clause
was present in the original adoption of Rule 404(b) in 1975, only recently have
a handful of federal courts begun to meaningfully address its scope.6" The case
law reveals the burgeoning confusion of courts asked to interpret Rule 404(b),
its advisory committee notes, and how, when added to the pieces of criminal
procedure and established trial procedure, the other acts evidentiary puzzle fits
together.
A. Case Law: Other Acts Without Character Limitation
In United States v. Vega61 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first
to remove character from Rule 404(b) analysis. The defendant, Hermelinda
Vega, was arrested at the Calexico, California, Port of Entry while attempting
to cross from Mexico into the United States with 89.8 pounds of marijuana
hidden in her van.62 Prior to trial, Vega properly requested that all other acts
evidence be disclosed pursuant to Rule 404(b).63 The prosecution responded
that it was not aware of any such evidence.' During trial, Vega testified that
she had no knowledge of any marijuana or other controlled substance
concealed in her van upon entering the United States.6" While on the stand,
Vega professed that the reason she had traveled to Mexico was because of an
extramarital affair with a person residing in Mexico.66
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked her about certain previous trips
to Mexico, all of which were followed by substantial cash deposits to her bank
account.67 Vega admitted to these prior trips and deposits.6" Following the close
of Vega's defense, the prosecutor called two witnesses on rebuttal, a customs
inspector and a custodian of records from Vega's bank.69 The witnesses
57. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997); Huddleston v. United States,
485 U.S. 681, 685-86 (1988).
58. See supra note 57.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Vega, 188 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that other acts
is inclusive of all extrinsic acts).
60. See id.; United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Beverly,
5 F.3d 633 (2d Cir. 1993).
61. 188F.3dat 1150.
62. Id. at 1152.
63. Id. at 1153.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1152-53.
66. Id. at 1153.
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testified consistently with Vega's admissions but with more specificity that,
based on electronic records, Vega had in fact crossed the border on several
previous occasions and that her crossings were followed by large cash deposits
into her bank account.70 The district court found Vega guilty of importation of
marijuana, possession of marijuana, and aiding and abetting.7 She appealed
and claimed that the court erred in admitting evidence of her prior border
crossings and bank deposits. Vega argued the prosecution failed to give
pretrial or timely notice as mandated by the 1991 amendment to Rule 404(b).73
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the conviction and remanded the case
for a new trial, holding that notice should have been given pursuant to Rule
404(b) for both the prior border crossings and the bank deposits.74 The court
stated:
First, we examine whether evidence of Vega's prior border
crossings and bank deposits is other acts evidence subject to
the provisions of Rule 404(b). We conclude that it is. As an
initial matter, we note that this rule applies to all "other
acts," notjust bad acts. Thus, despite the fact that there is
nothing intrinsically improper about Vega's prior border
crossings or bank deposits, they are nonetheless subject to
404(b).75
The court's interpretation of Rule 404(b) was guided by its view of the
following three elements that demonstrate compliance with Rule 404(b)
disclosure: (1) whether the accused made a Rule 404(b) request; (2) whether
the prosecution intended to introduce this evidence at trial; and (3) if so,
whether the prosecution provided reasonable notice.76 "It is of no consequence
that the government did not know with absolute certainty that it would
introduce that evidence until the defendant took the stand. The rule mandates
that the government provide notice even if the government intends to introduce
the evidence for impeachment or for possible rebuttal. ' 77 The court held that
the first two requirements were answered affirmatively, and the prosecution's
failure to provide reasonable notice led the court to vacate Vega's conviction.78
A closer look at Vega reveals that the breadth of its holding on other acts
is distinct from the facts. The evidence introduced obviously presents negative
character inferences. The clear inference for the jury was that, on several
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1152.
72. Id.
73. Vega, 188 F.3d at 1152.
74. Id. at 1152, 1155.
75. Id. at 1154 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1155.
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previous occasions, Vega had brought back something to sell in the United
States. From this inference, the jury could deduce that the crime charged was
part of an ongoing criminal venture to import marijuana. This possible
inference establishes that the evidence was extremely prejudicial.79
Accordingly, the extrinsic act evidence in Vega was appropriately held to be
under the governance of Rule 404(b) because it reflected on character and was
introduced to prove an element of the charged crime separate from character
or propensity. However, the way the issue was presented to the court of appeals
by the prosecution is that in an of itself, there are no intrinsic character
connotations associated with crossing the border or making bank
deposits-they are both acts reflecting neutrally on character.8"
The court of appeals responded to this issue by going outside the scope of
the argument.8 The court stated that it is completely irrelevant whether or not
the other acts in question are character-neutral acts because, "[a]s an initial
matter, we note that this rule applies to all 'other acts,' not just bad acts."82 A
more appropriate treatment of the issue would have limited the court's analysis
to whether the particular acts in question were properly under Rule 404(b). The
court did not need to proceed any further. The court's proclamation of the
rule's governance over infinite other acts is substantially broader than the scope
of the issue before it and may arguably be considered dictum. But regardless
of how the court of appeals reached its interpretation of other acts, the lesson
of Vega comes from the expanse of its language and its effect on trial
procedure. The holding of the court of appeals infinitely broadened the scope
of 404(b)'s other acts. In Vega the Ninth Circuit established that any extrinsic
act, without limitation, regardless of whether or not it speaks to character or
propensity, is now subject to notice by the prosecution under the 1991
amendment to Rule 404(b):
The Vega court's view was followed by the U.S. District Court in the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, in two 2000 decisions. 3 First,
in United States v. Lim 4 the court cited Vega and supported the Ninth Circuit's
characterization of Rule 404(b). 5
The Court directs the government to disclose not only all
other act evidence that it intends to offer in its case in chief,
but also any such evidence that it intends to offer to impeach
any witness (including the defendant) or in rebuttal. The
79. See Vega, 188 F.3d at 1153-54.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 1153 (holding that rule 404(b) applies to all other acts).
82. Id. at 1154 (emphasis added).
83. See United States v. Siegfried, No. 99-CR-752, 2000 WL 988164 (N.D. 11. July 18,
2000); United States v. Lim, No. 99-CR-689, 2000 WL 782964 (N.D. 111. June 15, 2000).
84. 2000 WL 782964.
85. Id. at *2.
2002]
15
Bowie: Rule 404(b)'s "Other Acts" Character Flaw
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 404(b) make it clear that
this is what the 1991 amendment requires.8 6
In so stating, another federal court held that any impeachment of a defendant
through other acts was governed by Rule 404(b)'s notice requirement, again
removing any character revealing requirement from 404(b) evidence based on
the recommendations of the advisory committee notes.
In addition, the court acknowledged the unavoidable conflict between
Rules 608(b) and 404(b) and effectively held that Rule 404(b)'s notice
requirement takes precedence over the provisions of 608(b):
However, to the extent that evidence to be used to impeach
under Rule 608(b) constitutes "other act" evidence within the
meaning of Rule 404(b) and the 1991 Advisory Committee
Notes, the fact that it might also be admissible under Rule
608(b) will not excuse the government from producing it
prior to trial pursuant to the Court's ruling on defendant's
motion for disclosure of other act evidence.87
Subsequently, in United States v. Siegfried8 the district court continued its
support of Vega when it similarly held that other act evidence used to impeach
a defendant must be disclosed.89
The impact of the Vega decision surfaced with full force in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California in United States v. Castro-
Zepeda.9" The defendant, Castro-Zepeda, was arrested when he attempted to
cross into the United States from Mexico with 36.08 pounds of marijuana
hidden inside a modified gas tank.91 As in Vega, the defense again properly
asked for pretrial discovery of all Rule 404(b) evidence.92 Then, in its opening
statement, the defense claimed Castro-Zepeda was set up by an associate
named Felix Tirado.93 Upon taking the stand, the defendant described his
relationship with Tirado.94 Castro-Zepeda explained that he believed Tirado
was responsible for altering the gas tank and for placing marijuana inside it
with the intent of having it transported into the United States without the
defendant's knowledge.95 On cross-examination, the prosecution further
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id.
88. 2000 WL 988164.
89. Id. at *4.
90. United States v. Castro-Zepeda, No. 01CR2163-BTM (S.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2002).
91. See Brief for Appellee United States at 3-4, United States v. Castro-Zepeda, No. 01-
50606 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2002).
92. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 468, United States v. Castro-Zepeda, No.
01CR2163-BTM (S.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2002).
93. Id. at 326-32.
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inquired about the defendant's association with Tirado.96 The prosecution
asked him if there had been any subsequent contact between himself and
Tirado since the arrest."' Castro-Zepeda responded that his friendship with
Tirado was over because he was angry with Tirado for setting him up and that
he had not had any subsequent contact with Tirado9
At this point, the prosecution attempted to introduce a certified California
Department of Motor Vehicles record into evidence, which stated that the
defendant had sold Tirado one of his personal cars ten days after the arrest.9
The prosecution would have thereby impeached the defendant's statements and
would have effectively refuted Castro-Zepeda's defense. The defendant
objected to the entire cross-examination based on Rule 404(b) and Vega.
100
The district court considered the objection outside the presence of the jury
and eventually ruled that whether Castro-Zepeda sold a car to Tirado was other
act evidence governed by Rule 404(b) 1" Consequently, because the
prosecution failed to notify the defense of the evidence, it was held
inadmissible under the rule."2
Following Castro-Zepeda's testimony, the court declared a mistrial.'0 3
Then, Castro-Zepeda made a motion to dismiss the indictment on double
jeopardy grounds.' " The district court denied the motion, granted a stay, and
the parties appealed the rulings of the court." 5 The Ninth Circuit summarily
affirmed the district court's ruling. 6
96. Id. at 427-28.
97. Id. at 427.
98. Reporter's Transcript at 427, Castro-Zepeda (No. 01CR2163-BTM).
99. Id. at 430-31.
100. Id. at 431-32, 466.
101. Id. at 466-96, 551.
102. Id. at 551.
103. Brief for Appellee at 3, Castro-Zepeda (No. 01-50606).
104. Id.
105. Reporter's Transcript at 554, Castro-Zepeda (No. 01CR2163-BTM).
106. United States v. Castro-Zepeda, No. 01-50606,2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 23851 (9th Cir.
Nov. 18, 2002). In a footnote to its unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals stated:
We decline to accept the government's invitation that we reexamine and
clarify the scope of our decision in United States v. Vega, 188 F.3d 1150
(9th Cir. 1999), which addresses Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence .... We comment only that we see no prosecutorial misconduct
or intentional impropriety in the failure to disclose impeachment evidence
that was held by the district court to contravene Rule 404(b).
Id. at *3. However, the district court judge had noted,
Maybe even the Court of Appeals will say under the circumstances this is
not the type of thing that has to be disclosed under 404(b). That is not the
way I read the situation, but I think further guidance from them would be
really helpful in trying a lot of these cases, and maybe we will get an
answer.... I don't think people understand that the Vega case and Rule
404(b) and the committee notes for 404(b) mean that even if you are going
to use it to impeach in cross-examination, you have to disclose it in advance.
I think this case will send a message out ....
Reporter's Transcript at 552-53, Castro-Zepeda (No. 01CR2163-BTM).
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Castro-Zepeda is significantly different from Vega for Rule 404(b)
purposes. In Vega the introduction of border crossings and cash deposits as
evidence was likely governed by the rule because it resulted in prejudicial
character inferences. However, in Castro-Zepeda the maximum scope of the
Vega holding was applied to evidence which truly had no reflection on the
defendant's character. The sale of a car to Felix Tirado reveals nothing about
character or propensity, nor was it an act done in furtherance of a criminal
scheme. The Department of Motor Vehicles record proferred in Castro-Zepeda
does nothing more than prove the defendant lied about his association with
Tirado. Although the holding of Vega imputed little harm to the interested
parties due to other facts of the case," 7 the result of the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of other acts, as applied in the context of Castro-Zepeda, is
egregious. Castro-Zepeda is therefore illustrative of the damaging effects of
Vega's overbroad other acts scope.
B. Case Law: "Other Acts" Confined
United States v. Beverly"°8 is in contrast to the Vega decision. There, the
Second Circuit held that evidence offered to impeach a defendant or offered in
rebuttal does not fall under Rule 404(b) or Rule 608."09 The defendants in
Beverly were allegedly involved in a conspiracy to sell crack cocaine and were
indicted on various charges, including firearms violations.110 During trial, one
of the defendants, Charles Tyrone White, took the stand and asserted on both
direct and cross-examination that he had never possessed a gun in Albany, New
York.1"' He also maintained that his only experience with a gun came at a firing
range as part of his employment as a security guard and, further, that he was
not in Albany on March 28 or March 29 of 1991. "2 Subsequently,
[o]n cross-examination, the government questioned White
regarding several prior incidents in which he allegedly
possessed and used firearms. Through cross-examination and
on rebuttal, the government introduced evidence [that] White
committed two shootings in Albany on March 28 and March
29, 1991. At the time of trial, state charges against White
arising from these shootings were pending. 3
107. The broad scope of the court's ruling was inconsequential to the parties because the acts
in question reflected upon character and triggered Rule 404(b) application.
108. 5 F.3d 633 (2d Cir. 1993).
109. Id. at 639.
110. Id. at 636.
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Thus, in response to White's testimony, the prosecution introduced extrinsic
act evidence to impeach his statements. White was subsequently convicted of
several firearms violations and other charges, from which he appealed."'4
On appeal, White argued that the evidence implicating him in the Albany
shootings was admitted in violation of Rules 404(b) and 608(b)."5 The Second
Circuit rejected this argument because "[tihe government's questioning arose
in the form of impeachment of specific falsehoods, not as an attack on his
general character for truthfulness, Fed. R. Evid. 608(b), nor as an attempt to
prove his bad character in order to show he acted in conformity therewith, Fed.
R. Evid. 404(b)."" 6 The court further explained its decision:
"Central to the proper operation of the adversary system is
the notion that 'when a defendant takes the stand, the
government be permitted proper and effective cross-
examination in an attempt to elicit the truth."' Once a
defendant has put certain activity in issue by offering
innocent explanations for or denying wrongdoing, the
government is entitled to rebut by showing that the defendant
has lied. Where a defendant testifies on direct about a specific
fact, the prosecution is entitled to prove on cross-examination
that he lied as to that fact. The same holds true for
defendant's false statements on cross-examination. Finally,
the government's opportunity to impeach the defendant's
credibility once he has taken the stand includes the
opportunity to use evidence that it was barred from using on
its direct case." 7
In rejecting White's argument, the court declined to adopt a textualist
interpretation of Rule 404(b) and its notice requirement. Instead, the court
recognized the necessity of cross-examining specific falsehoods.
The conclusions of the Beverly court conflict with the holdings of Vega
and Castro-Zepeda. While Beverly does not specifically address the character
requirements of Rule 404(b)'s other acts, it does provide a sensible description
of the consequences of other acts interpretations.' In both Vega and Castro-
Zepeda the consequence of the courts' interpretations was an inability to
impeach defendants. Beverly stands in stark contrast to these cases and
emphasizes the absurdity of denying effective cross-examination through Rule
404(b)'s notice requirement. Beverly supports the merits of classic
114. Beverly, 5 F.3d at 636.
115. Id. at 639.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 639-40 (citations omitted).
118. See id. at 633 (advocating the need for effective cross-examination despite the plain
language requirements of Rule 404(b)).
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impeachment by contradiction when other acts introduced as evidence did not
"attempt to prove... character."" 9
The Fifth Circuit has also addressed the interplay between Rules 404(b)
and 608(b) in United States v. Tomblin.'20 In this case, the defendant was
convicted of bribery, extortion, and other offenses."'2 The defendant took the
stand, and on cross-examination, the prosecution questioned him about alleged
acts of misconduct.'22 The defense objected to the prosecution's introduction
of other acts evidence for the purpose of impeachment on Rule 404(b)
grounds.' In response, the court stated:
Whether Rule 404(b) or Rule 608(b) applies to the
admissibility of other-act evidence depends on the purpose
for which the prosecutor introduced the other-acts evidence.
Rule 404(b) applies when other-acts evidence is offered as
relevant to an issue in the case, such as identity or intent.
Rule 608(b) applies when other-acts evidence is offered to
impeach a witness, "to show the character of the witness for
untruthfulness," or to show bias.
. . . [T]he prosecutor's questions were probative of
Tomblin's character for truthfulness and were permissible
under Rule 608(b). Accordingly, we conclude that the
provision of Rule 404(b) that requires the prosecutor to give
notice of his intention to use other-acts evidence does not
apply here."24
The Tomblin court notably chose not to apply the notice requirement to
extrinsic act evidence, which, under Vega, would be inadmissible without
notice. In doing so, the court strongly suggests that the notice requirement is
not a bar to admissibility when evidence is properly admissible on other
grounds.
Tomblin makes a significant distinction between the rules of evidence-a
distinction which is not present in the Vega court's resolution of the issue.
Tomblin is also unmistakably in direct conflict with Lim's holding that Rule
404(b) trumps Rule 608(b).'25 The absolutism of other acts disclosure evident
in the Ninth Circuit and the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
119. Id. at 639.
120. 46 F.3d 1369 (5th Cir. 1995).
121. Id. at 1374.
122. Id. at 1388.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1388-89 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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is conspicuously absent from the Fifth Circuit's ruling on the issue.'26 In
analyzing these cases, it is readily apparent that the other acts interpretation
under the notice requirement is markedly different among the circuits that have
reached the issue.
C. Consequences
The impact of other acts interpretations becomes clear after comparing
Beverly and Tomblin with Vega's interpretation of Rule 404(b). Under Vega's
reading, other acts evidence is not admissible unless proper notice is given.'
Prior to Vega, prosecutors had the ability to strategically protect other acts
evidence before and during trial, which allowed them to anticipate a
defendant's testimony or alibi and contradict it with evidence the defendant did
not know existed.' Under Vega, the all-encompassing notice requirement
allows a defendant to tailor testimony around the knowledge of every piece of
evidence a prosecutor has at his or her disposal, which all but eliminates the
opportunity for an effective cross-examination. 2 9
Until now, a competent prosecutor could prepare for trial,
complying with Rule 16, the Jencks Act, Brady obligations,
and other discovery orders of the court, with some sense of
security in the knowledge that some evidence did not need to
be turned over to the defense immediately. Rather, it could
appropriately be held in reserve and available either for cross-
examination or rebuttal purposes. It was a good check on a
lying defendant-or a defendant that was particularly good at
weaving his story around known facts. 3
Thus, the real issue of the other acts clause is the consequences that result
from reading it to mandate full disclosure of a prosecutor's evidentiary arsenal.
The ultimate consequence of interpreting other acts to include all extrinsic acts
is that the prosecution's ability to challenge a defendant's testimony is
significantly obstructed.
V. WHO IS RIGHT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT
The two trends of relevant Rule 404(b) case law are that the majority of the
courts implicitly recognize the rule's association with character' 3' and that
126. See Tomblin, 46 F.3d at 1388.
127. See United States v. Vega, 188 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 1999).
128. Brief for Appellee United States at 23, United States v. Castro-Zepeda, No. 0 1-50606,
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 23851 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2002).
129. Id.
130. Id. (citations omitted).
131. See supra discussion Part III.B.
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there are conflicting interpretations of other acts. 32 In trying to interpret other
acts without much guidance, each court has marched uniquely across Rule
404(b) issues. The respective paths taken by these courts serve to demonstrate
the errors and benefits of certain interpretations. When placed into the character
context of Rule 404, the appropriate scope of other acts becomes clear.
The scope of other acts has to first be viewed through the overarching
policy and basic tenet of Rule 404: character.'33 Interpreting the rule without
regard to character flies in the face of the case law. 34 "Other crimes, wrongs,
or acts," under the common law,\the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Huddleston v. United States'35 and Old Chiefv. United States, a6 and under the
context of the rule itself, should not be read to encompass all acts without a
character limitation. Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit did just that in United
States v. Vega.'37 The Court analyzed other acts without considering the rule's
character relevance.'38 Therefore, the Vega interpretation should either be
overlooked by courts considering the issue or flatly rejected.
However, Vega's overbroad interpretation of other acts can be rationalized
by the plain language of amended Rule 404(b) and its advisory committee
notes. In analyzing the holding of Vega, it is difficult to see the court's efforts
going beyond the plain language of Rule 404(b). On its face, without regard to
context, the phrase other acts certainly extends to a limitless variety of acts.
Also, a look at the advisory committee notes on the 1991 amendment
superficially reveals that notice is required for all extrinsic act evidence used
during a case-in-chief, for impeachment or possible rebuttal.' 9 The Vega
court's conclusions may be justified by a plain reading of the rule, but this
potential justification is not enough.
"The lesson of famous cases .. .is that major public policy concerns
require more from our judges than mere devotion to technical rules of
evidence."' 40 Vega pronounced Rule 404(b)'s governance over all other acts
without considering the issue in detail. 4' The court likely only relied on the
plain language of the rule and its advisory committee notes, and it is unclear
whether the court considered the full implications of its broad ruling. It appears
the court either overlooked or ignored the character nature of Rule 404(b), thus
132. Compare Vega, 188 F.3d at 1154 (requiring notice of all extrinsic act evidence), with
United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that defendant's invocation of
Rule 404(b) to require notice of extrinsic act evidence was misplaced).
133. See generally FED. R. EvID. 404 (observing the title and context of the rule reveals its
character foundation).
134. See supra discussion Part III.B.
135. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
136. 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
137. 188 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1999).
138. Id. at 1154.
139. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's note on 1991 amendment.
140. Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules
404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135, 139 (1989).
141. Vega, 188 F.3d at 1154.
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denying itself the opportunity to view the issue as part of a "bigger picture."
Without considering the interplay between evidentiary rules, the court
drastically changed the ability of prosecutors to effectively expose lying
defendants.
The advisory committee notes on the 1991 amendments state, "The
Committee does not intend that the amendment will supercede other rules of
admissibility or disclosure .... Nor is the amendment intended to redefine
what evidence would otherwise be admissible under Rule 404(b).' ' 42 However,
the interplay between Rule 404(b) and Rule 608(b) is particularly undercut by
Vega, in contrast with the legislative intent of 404(b), because it elevates Rule
404(b) and eviscerates Rule 608(b).'43 There is no evidence that the drafters of
the 1991 amendment envisioned the rule's notice requirement to encompass the
expanse of non-character-related, extrinsic act evidence offered to contradict
a lying defendant, yet Vega and its progeny do just that.
A more reasoned approach has been taken by the Second and Fifth
Circuits. In United States v. Beverly'" and United States v. Tomblin145 the
courts incorporated the competing interests present among rules of evidence,
criminal procedure, and public policy. Rather than giving a blind devotion to
the plain language of Rule 404(b) and its advisory committee notes, Beverly
and Tomblin recognize the parameters of the rule that allow an interpretation
that is more compatible with the rule's history and context.
The significance of Beverly and Tomblin is in the way they circumnavigate
the scope of other acts by addressing whether the notice requirement should
apply to extrinsic evidence offered to impeach by contradiction. Beverly stands
for the proposition that a prosecutor should be allowed the opportunity to
prove, on cross-examination, that a defendant has lied by introducing
impeachment evidence without regard to Rule 404(b). Similarly, Tomblin
stands for the notion that extrinsic act evidence used to impeach does not fall
prey to Rule 404(b). These cases express the view that other act evidence used
to impeach specific falsehoods does not implicate the notice requirement.
Therefore, the scope of other acts is confined by the Second and Fifth Circuits'
respective exclusion of other act impeachment evidence from the rule's notice
requirement.
Therefore, the view that "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" includes all other
acts without limitation is effectively combated on two fronts. First, the scope
of other acts should result from Rule 404(b)'s application only to extrinsic
evidence reflecting upon character. Second, extrinsic evidence used for
impeachment by contradiction should not be subject to the rule's notice
142. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's note on 1991 amendment.
143. See generally Vega, 188 F.3d at 1154 (holding that any extrinsic act introduced to
impeach is subject to Rule 404(b) and is not admissible without notice even though it may be
proper under Rule 608).
144. Beverly, 5 F.3d at 639.
145. Tomblin, 46 F.3d at 1388.
2002]
23
Bowie: Rule 404(b)'s "Other Acts" Character Flaw
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
requirement. Thus, the history of Rule 404, combined with the reasoning of
Beverly and Tomblin, serves to control the scope of other acts from two sides:
(1) character; and (2) impeachment by contradiction. Accordingly, the other
acts clause should properly be read to include all extrinsic act evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts that reflect upon character, unless the offered evidence
is introduced to impeach a defendant by contradiction. A clear statement from
an appellate court reflecting these parameters for the scope of Rule 404(b)'s
other acts would provide appropriate and needed direction for the future of
other acts application.
VI. CONCLUSION
Extrinsic acts that do not raise a character inference do not come under the
umbrella of Rule 404(b)'s provisions. Rule 404(b) analysis should be invoked
by the courts only when evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" that
reflects upon character is introduced to prove elements of an alleged crime.
Although recent decisions have brought to life the dangerous wording of the
amended rule and its advisory committee notes, the overbroad reach of the
Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Vega only stresses the importance
of a requisite character-link for offered other acts evidence. Other acts cannot
logically be held to include reading a book, riding a bike, or any other act that
suggests nothing about the character or propensity of a person to commit an
alleged crime. Rule 404(b)'s ambiguous other acts clause must be read in the
context of Rule 404's basic character component. Rule 404(b) is a product of
Congress's intent to regulate the prejudicial effect of character evidence, but
the continued judicial removal of character as a component of other acts has
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